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STUDENT NOTES
4. When the Judgment is not Proper Because of Prior Errors
of the Court.
Another way in which a party may lose his right to a, judgment
non obstante is through the court's committing errors prior to the
refusal to grant the motion for judgment. For example, in an action
on a fire insurance policy, plaintiff's petition failed to allege any loss
sustained, and there was no evidence offered by plaintiff to cure this
defect. At the close of the evidence, defendant made a motion for a
peremptory instruction for a verdict in his favor, which was denied by
the trial court. After the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, the
defendant moved for judgment non obstante, which was also denied.
On appeal, the court held that defendant was not entitled to a judg-
ment non obstante, but only to a new trial for the error of the court
In refusing to grant the motion for peremptory instruction.,' Many
other cases are in accord with this principle.' The Kentucky Court of
Appeals has said, "This court is committed to the doctrine that in this
situation the first error of the trial court will be corrected on appeal."'
In conclusion it may be stated briefly that under Kentucky Code
Section 386 as it has been interpreted by the Court of Appeals, a party
may properly move for a judgment notwithstanding a verdict for the
adverse party when
1) the pleadings of the adverse party are insufficient in substance
to allege a cause of action or constitute matter of defense, and
that defect has not been cured by subsequent pleadings or by
the verdict, and
2) the trial court has not committed previous errors, such as
refusing a proper peremptory instruction, and
3) the motion is made before entering of judgment in conformity
with the verdict.
A flora VOGELES
REVIVAL BY REVOCATION OF A LATER INSTRUMENT-EFFECT
OF A REVOCATORY CLAUSE
In England prior to the Will's Act of 18371 there were two distinct
views as to the revival of a will by the destruction or revocation of a
subsequent and revoking will. Under the common law rule a former
will which had been left uncanceled and preserved was automatically
Ct. Fire Ins. Co. v. Moore, 154 Ky. 18, 156 S.W. 867 (1913).
"Mast et al. v. Lehman, 100 Ky. 464, 38 S.W. 1056 (1897); L. & N.
Ry. v. Paynter's Admr., 26 Ky. L. Rep. 761, 82 S.W. 412 (1904); Ct.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Moore, 154 Ky. 18, 156 S.W. 867 (1913); L. & N. Ry. v.
Johnson, 168 Ky. 351, 182 S.W. 214, L.R.A. 1916D, 514 (1916) ; Sheffield-
King Milling Co. v. Sorg, 180 Ky. 539, 203 S.W. 300 (1918); Baskett v.
Combs' Admr., 198 Ky. 17, 247 S.W. 1118 (1923); Franklin Fire Ins. Co.
v. Cook's Admr. et al., 216 Ky. 15, 287- S.W. 553 (1926). But see Weikel
v. Alt, 234 Ky. 91, 27 S.W. (2d) 684 (1930).
'Jones v. Hendley, 224 Ky. 83, 5 S.W. (2d) 482 (1928).
'Act. 1, Vic. c. 26, Sec. 22 (1837).
K. L. J.-9
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revived by the destruction of a later revoking instrument Under the
Ecclesiastical rule, whether the prior instrument was revived depended
entirely upon the intention of the testator, the act itself creating no
presumption as to revival of the former instrument. The intention of
testator might be shown by extrinsic evidence.3 The Will's Act pro-
vided that a will could be revived only by a new will or codicil or by
re-execution, and the courts construed revocation by subsequent instru-
ment to be effective from the date of its execution.4 Consequently,
both the common law rule and the Ecclesiastical rule were, in effect,
abolished.
American jurisdictions vary greatly on this question of revival by
revocation of a later and revoking instrument. Several states have
enacted statutes very similar to the English Will's Act, making re-
execution or codicillary republication necessary 5 By statute or con-
struction some follow the English common law rule and some follow
the English ecclesiastical rule1 All states except Tennessee have
statutory provisions for the revocation of willsO
It is the purpose of this paper to determine to what extent Ameri-
can jurisdictions' distinguish, in this matter of revival, between a later
revoking instrument which contains a clause of revocation and one
that is inconsistent, only. This question is expressly settled by stat-
utes in some states,0 but this note is concerned chiefly with the atti-
2 Page on Wills (2d Ed.) Vol. I, Sec. 422 et seq. See also, Good-
right v. Glazier, 4 Burr. (Eng.) 2512 (1770), Harwood v. Goodright,
1 Cowp. (Eng.) 87, 91 (1774).
3Usticke v. Bawden 2 Addams (Eng. Eccl.) 116 (1824).
'Page on Wills (2d Ed.), Vol. I See. 446.
5For list, see (1922) 7 Minn. Law Rev. 158, Note 11, and Rood on
Wills (2d Ed.), Sec. 363, Note 72. Kentucky is included in this group
and its statute is to be commended. Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1936), Sec. 4834:
"No will or any part thereof which shall be in any manner revoked,
shall, after being revoked, be revived otherwise than by re-execution
thereof, or by a codicil executed in the manner hereinbefore required;
and then only to the extent to which an intention to revive the same
is shown therein."
0 Rood on Wills (2d Ed.), Sec. 361, Note 63.
7 Ibid, Sec. 362, Note 65.
8 Bordwell, Statute, Law of Wills, (1929) 14 Iowa Law Rev. 283.
9 In James v. Marvin (see note 10, infra) the court cited Powell on
Dev. (Ed. of 1827, p. 527, 528) as indicating that the Early English
courts did recognize some distinction between a later will with express
revocation and one without, in the matter of reviving the former will.
But it would be difficult to say that this was the general rule in
England for it was not always clear whether the English courts were
speaking of a will with an express revocation or one that was incon-
sistent merely. However, subsequent to the Will's Act that problem
has given the English courts no concern, since the former will must be
re-executed in either case.
"Georgia Statutes (Parks Ann. Code, Vol. 3, Sec. 3917, 3920) pro-
vide that an express revocation "takes effect instantly and independ-
ently of the validity or ultimate fate of the will or other instrument
containing it" but an implied revocation arising from inconsistent
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tude and holdings of courts which are not thus limited by statutes.
Is a former (and still existing) will revived by the destruction or
revocation of a later will which is inconsistent merely and is it not
revived thus when the later will expressly revokes the former? Due
to hasty statements on the part of text-writers and ill-considered dicta
on the part of courts there is much more confusion on this matter than
is justified by the actual holdings of the courts. This confusion is due
In no small part to the fact that decisions are so often affected by the
various state statutes and because different jurisdictions follow dif-
ferent rules. In discussing this problem the theory upon which the
distinction between the two kinds of wills is made will first be con-
sidered and then the leading cases of those jurisdictions which are
generally cited as making such distinction will be examined and con-
sidered.
On what basis or theory is such distinction made? Those who dis-
tinguish between the two kinds of wills necessarily adhere to the doc-
trine that express revocation is immediately effective upon the execu-
tion of the will. That doctrine is clearly promulgated in its leading
case, James v. Marvin" which is one of the few cases that clearly hold
that such a distinction exists. In that case it was said that a will
revoking by inconsistent provisions is ambulatory until the death of
the testator, and that although the testator intends to revoke the first
will when he makes the second one, he may change his intentions at
any time before his death. An express revocation, it was said, is
Instantaneous, revoking the former will by its own force without
regard to the consummation of the will of which it is a part, or the
future disposition of the property.
If the intention of the testator Is to govern, certainly the insertion
of an express revocation is not conclusive in determining such intent.
The revocatory clause might be inserted by the testator or his scrive-
ner as a matter of form with little thought as to its effect. And while
it may be persuasive evidence that the testator meant the later will
wholly to revoke the former if it became operative it is far less per-
suasive that testator intended the revocation to be effective at all
events and without regard to the fate of the instrument of which the
revocatory clause is a part. While such a clause might be the deciding
factor in determining testator's intent in some cases, the desirable
course to pursue is to admit evidence under both situations, and having
determined testator's intent, render judgment accordingly.
will "takes effect only when the inconsistent will becomes effectual,
and hence, If from any cause it fails, the revocation is not completed".
However, It is further provided that the intention of the testator to
revoke is necessary in all cases and that "an express revocation clause
will not operate upon a testamentary paper where it is manifest that
such was not the Intention". A Missouri statute (Rev. Stat. 1929,
See. 524) provides that canceling or revoking a later will does not
revive the first unless it appears that testator's intentions were such,
etc.
"3 Conn. 576 (1821).
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Suppose that T has given Blackacre to, A by will. In a later will
he gives Blackacre to B. Certainly T's intention is, when he executes
the second will, that B shall have Blackacre and A shall not have it.
But suppose that T then cancels or revokes the second will. It is clear
that he does not wish B to have Blackacre but does it mean that he
now wishes A to have it or that he does not intend that either A or B
shall have it? The mere act of destroying the second will, whether it
contained express revocation or not, will throw little light on his inten-
tions but the circumstances under which it is done may do so. If the
first will is preserved and is treated by T as his will, evidenced by his
words or acts, then the fact that it contains express revocation should
not prevent the revival of the first. On. the other hand, if T has not
preserved the first will with any care and there is evidence that he does
not treat it as a valid will it should not be held revived although there
is no express revocation in the second will. Oral expressions or acts
of T when the express revocation is inserted may clearly reveal his
intention, but when taken alone it should be accorded very little weight.
As to the statutory provisions for revoking wills, most of the states
fall into two groups. One group follows the English Statute of Wills,
providing that a will may be revoked by "burning . . . or by
another will or codicil, or some other declaration in writing, etc.""'
Seven states restrict revocation by instrument to "will or codicil" only.u
The contention that the revocatory clause takes effect immediately Is
usually found in courts of the first group of states. Those of the second
group (if unaffected by statute) tend to accept the view that since a
will can be revoked by a will or codicil, only, the revocatory clause
can be effective only as a part of the will, and it, therefore, is ambula-
tory and not effective until testator's death. But under the statute add-
ing "other writing" it is contended by some that the revocatory clause
may be treated as a declaration in writing separate and apart from the
rest of the will. The logic of this view is questionable. It seems
unsound to say that the revocatory clause is not a part of the will, or
that it can be treated as a separate and effective instrument within
itself, although the will in which it is found may never become effec-
tive but canceled or destroyed before testator's death. If this view is
accepted it would seem just as logical to consider an instrument which
is wholly inconsistent with a former will as a revocation declared in
writing, etc., apart from its disposition of property, and immediately
effective. In either case the intention of the testator should prevail.
The effect of the statute providing for revocation by written instru-
ment other than a will or codicil is illustrated by the Connecticut court
when it overruled or reversed James v. Marvin. In 1822, the year
following the decision in the Marvin case the Connecticut legislature
enacted a statute which provided that a later "will or codicil" should
2See Bordwell Statzte Law of Wills, (1929) 14 Iowa Law Rev. 283,
for a discussion and treatment of the various state statutes on revoca-
tion of wills.
"Ibid. States named: Colo., Conn., Iowa, Mo., Nev., Wash., Wyo.
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be the means of revoking a will by instrument. In Peck's Appeal"
the doctrine promulgated in James v. Marvin was somewhat modified
and in Whitehill v. Habling'6 (1922) the Connecticut court completely
repudiated that doctrine. In that case the testator destroyed a second
will which contained a clause of revocation, expressing his intention
that the first will should be valid, and the court so held it. The court
based its decision on the statute enacted in 1822 and declared that this
had been the rule in Connecticut ever since the statute had been
enacted. Under the statute, it was said, a will could not be revoked
except by a will or codicil, effective at testator's death.
In a dissenting opinion in Whitehill v. Habling it was argued that
the legislators did not have in mind an operative will when they pro-
vided that revocation may be by a will or codicil but that such revoca-
tion was effective upon the execution of the will. This construction
seems to be followed in those jurisdictions which have a statute similar
to the Will's Act which provided that, "no will or codicil which shall in
any manner be revoked, shall be revived otherwise than by the re-execu-
tion thereof, etc." Under this statute the destruction of a second will
alone never has the effect of reviving a former will. It would seem,
therefore, that the first will, if revoked, must be revoked by the
execution of a second will which contains express revocation or incon-
sistent provisions. Indeed, if this construction is not to be accepted
the term "revival" is a misnomer in the discussion of this problem for,
if the revocation depends upon a will's becoming operative, a will which
never becomes operatives never revokes the former will, and a will
which has not been revoked cannot be revived. It has been suggested
that the term "restoration" might be more appropriate.16 If it is
accepted that revocation takes place upon the execution of the second
or later will, then the distinction between a will containing a revocation
clause and one which is merely inconsistent comes to naught.1 7
Jurisdictions generally cited as distinguishing between the two
kinds o1 wills. Although dicta on this question are widespread, few
states generally are cited as following the doctrine of express revocation.
The courts of Texas, Michigan, and Wisconsin have been referred to as
limiting their decisions that revocation of a later revoking will does
not revive the former, to cases in which the former will was expressly
1450 Conn. 562, 47 Am. Dec. 685 (1883).
1698 Conn. 21, 118 Atl. 454 (1922).
"Alvin E. Evans, Testmentary Revival, 16 Ky. Law Jour. 47
(1927).
11 In speaking on an inconsistent will here it is meant that the will
Is wholly inconsistent. A will which does not contain an express
clause of revocation and leaves property undisposed of would, under
most jurisdictions, be probated along with the former will which is
revoked only to the extent of the inconsistency. In a will disposing
of a large amount of property, in which there is a number of bequests
and devises, a residuary clause would have about the same effect as
a revocatory clause since it would show testator's intent that all his
property should pass by that will. See, 22 Ky. Law Journal 469, at
494.
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revoked by the later one.' These states all have statutes which provide
that a will may be revoked by written instrument other than a will or
codicil.
Hawes v. Nicholas' is often cited as a Texas case supporting the
doctrine that express revocation is immediate. While that case held
that the cancellation of a will expressly revoking all former wills does
not revive a former will there was only an inference that a will revok-
ing by implication, would have had a different effect. In Doughterv v.
HoZscheider there was a contingent will which revoked a former will
by inconsistent provisions, only. The contingency failed but the former
will which had not been re-executed was held invalid and the deceased
was held to be intestate. In construing the Texas statute in In re
Brackenridge,2 the court said that where an instrument contains an
express revocation of a former will it is not necessary that there be a
disposition of the property-or if the dispositive part of the will fails
the revocation is still good. This was not a case where the testator
revoked the second will but rather where he left it to become operative
as far as it could, and the fact that some parts of the will could not
be effective did not prevent the revocatory clause from revoking the
former one. No Texas case is found which holds that the destruction
of the second will, revoking by implication only, revives the former one.
In view of Texas decisions on this matter it is clearly wrong to say
that the Texas courts definitely distinguished between the two kinds
of wills.
A Michigan case, Cheever v. North- is considered a leading case for
the doctrine set out in James v. Marvin. Cheever v. North, like the
Marvin case, clearly distinguished between a second will containing an
express revocatory clause and one without such clause. The court
charged that if there was an express revocation in the later will the
first was immediately revoked but if the subsequent will contained no
clause revoking the former will, the subsequent destruction of the will
by the testator would revive the former one. In that case there was no
evidence whether the second will contained express revocation, and the
court held that the burden of proving the existence of such a clause was
upon the one alleging it, so, that, in effect, the decision was based on a
will containing no express revocation. Several Michigan cases prior to
Cheever v. North held that the destruction of a second will which
expressly revoked a former one did not revive the former,1 and numer-
ous cases since have held likewise, citing the Oheever case as authority,"
See, 28 A.L.R. 917.
1972 Tex. 481, 10 S.W. 558 (1889).
"40 Tex. Civ. App. 31, 88 S.W. 1113 (1905).
2114 Tex. 418, 245 S.W. 786 (1922).
- 106 Mich. 390, 64 N.W. 455, 37 L.R.A. 561 (1895).
1 See, Scott v. Fink, 45 Mich. 241, 7 N.W. 799 (1881), Steven v.
Hope, 52 Mich. 65, 17 N.W. 698 (1883) and cases cited therein.
1See, Danley v. Jefferson, 150 Mich. 590, 114 N.W. 470 (1908),
Dingman v. Dingman, 199 Mich. 384, 165 N.W. 712 (1917) and others.
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but no other case so clearly distinguishes between the two kinds of
wills.
A Wisconsin case, In re Noon's WiZZZ has been often referred to as
upholding the view that express revocation is immediately effective.
The court referred to the statute, in that case, providing for the revoca-
tion of wills by "another will or codicil, executed in writing", and said,
"therefore, when a second will is drawn and executed with the
formality required by statute, and containing an unlimited revocatory
clause, all former wills are wiped out and held for naught". While the
Wisconsin statute provided further that a will may be revoked, "(or)
by some other iriting," etc., the court did not refer to that part of
the statute. It might be said, therefore, that this decision is contrary
to Whitehifl v. Habing in that it is not based on the theory that a
revocatory clause is effective as a "writing" apart from the will. But
from the cases cited and the general language of the court, it is obvious
that it intended to follow the doctrine as set out by the other cases
without going into any detailed reasoning. Although it might be
inferred from the language of the court that a will revoking by implica-
tion, only, would cause a different decision to be reached, the case does
not hold that, and no such Wisconsin case has been found by the writer.
To summarize briefly: The question whether there is a distinction
between a later will which revokes by express terms and one which
revokes by implication, only, is inseperably connected with the proposi-
tion that express revocation is immediately effective. In many states
this question is settled by statute. Although there are many dicta on
the question only three states are generally conceded to distinguish
between the two kinds of wills, and of these, only one has given (so
far as the writer has found) an unequivocal decision in both respects.
PALmER L. HALL
DIVORCE-ALLOWANCE OF ALIMONY TO THE WIFE WHEN THE
DIVORCE IS GRANTED BECAUSE OF THE WIFE'S FAULT
Alimony was first granted by the ecclesiastical courts of England
as Incidental to a divorce a mensa et thoro. It was considered as the
allowance which a husband, by order of the court, paid to his wife living
separate from him for her maintenance. This was true because the
court could not decree an absolute divorce and the allowance was solely
for the wife's support, to continue during their joint lives, or so long
as they lived separate and apart.'
During the period in which the ecclesiastical court granted the
divorce a mensa et thoro, the decree a vinculo matrimonii was granted
only by act of Parliament when the marriage was for some cause unlaw-
ful ab initio. It should be noted that the husband was entitled to take
z 115 Wis. 299, 91 N.W. 670 (1902).
2II Poll. & Maitland Hist. of Eng. Law (2d ed. 1911), p. 392 to
396; Madden, Domestic Relations (1931), p. 256 to 261 and 319 to 330.
2II Poll. & Malt., Hist. of Eng. Law (2d el. 1911), p. 390; Madden,
